In this project we present a simple way to resolve a complicated network security. This is done by the following two ways. They are as follows, first is the decrypt only when necessary (DOWN) policy, which can substantially improve the ability of low-cost to protect the secrets. The DOWN policy relies on the ability to operate with fractional parts of secrets. We discuss the feasibility of extending the DOWN policy to various asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic primitives. The second is cryptographic authentication strategies which employ only symmetric cryptographic primitives, based on novel ID-based key predistribution schemes that demand very low complexity of operations to be performed by the secure coprocessors (ScP) and can take good advantage of the DOWN policy. Trustworthy Computing Under Resource Constraints With The Down Policy
In case of the existing system each and every system are considered as a trusted computer. And so the attacker finds it easy to attack the system with fake signals. And also in the emerging network where many are used for some good purpose. And in those there a lot of chance for the attacker to send unwanted information. In case of the fire alarm, if all the system are considered as trusted they could send false alarm where it lead to a heavy loss. And so we need a system to protect it. Hence we develop a new system.
The proposed system we introduce a new technology to protect the network. This is achieved by the following way. Realizing widespread adoption of such applications
Mandates sufficiently trustworthy computers that can be realized at low cost. Apart from facilitating deployment of futuristic applications, the ability to realize trustworthy computers at low cost can also addresses many of the security issues that plague our existing network infrastructure. Although, at first sight, “inexpensive” and “trustworthy”
May seem mutually exclusive, a possible strategy is to reduce the complexity of the components inside the trusted boundary. The often heard statement that “complexity is the enemy of security” is far from dogmatic. For one, lower complexity implies better verifiability of compliance. Furthermore, keeping the complexity inside the trust boundary at low levels can obviate the need for proactive measures for heat dissipation. Strategies constrained to simultaneously facilitate shielding and heat dissipation tend to be expensive. On the other hand, unconstrained shielding strategies can be reliable and inexpensive to facilitate.